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1 Introduction  
 
We would like to understand the effects and the causes of oil price 
changes.  What follows provides a very simple framework for trying to 
consider both simultaneously.  But the emphasis here will be mainly on 
the latter
1.  One of the main ideas proposed here is that the price of oil is 
endogenous, and determined along with other variables in a system of 
relationships.  Strictly speaking, an “oil price shock” is a misnomer.  Oil 
prices can jump or collapse for any of a variety of possible reasons.  The 
other developments that accompany the event depend on the nature of the 
shock.   
 
The central feature of a fossil fuel is that, while burning it provides an 
essential input into production, the stock is finite; burning it now 
forecloses the option of burning it later.  The intertemporal optimization 
problem posed by this relationship – different from capital accumulation, 
but with similarities – means that any thorough treatment of oil in the 
macroeconomy must be dynamic.  One early approach, pioneered by 
Solow (1974), is Keynesian in the sense that saving is held to be a given 
fraction of income, and not derived from an explicit trade-off between 
jam today and jam tomorrow.   This is not generally compatible with the 
optimizing approach first employed by Ramsey (1928).  What follows 
                                                 
1 The classic references on the effects of oil price changes are Bruno and Sachs (1982, 1982 and 1985). 
A recent survey has been written by Barsky and Kilian (2004).  Major textbooks on exhaustible 
resource theory – both oddly reticent, however, on macroeconomic models embedding them – are Heal 
and Dasgupta (1979) and Hartwick and Oleweiler (1998).      3
might be thought of as a simple marriage of Ramsey (1928) and Solow 
(1974).    
 
 




We shall begin by setting up a small model of the world economy with 
the following assumptions: 
  
(i)  a single final good, which may be consumed or (dis-)invested; 
(ii)  perfect competition in its fullest sense – marginal productivity 
factor pricing, market clearance, no uninternalized externalities, 
perfect information; 
(iii)  energy inputs into final production come exclusively from a 
homogeneous set of exhaustible fossil fuels, called “oil”, the 
remaining total stock of which S(t) at time t; 
(iv)  no fiscal activity; 
(v)  final production, Q(t) at time t,   is Cobb-Douglas in three 
factors, capital (K(t) in aggregate at t), total labour quality 
(B(t)N(t) in aggregate at t) and depletion of oil 
•
− )) ( ( t S  at t; there 
is a trendless Hicks neutral technology parameter T; returns to 
scale are constant; competitive factor shares, all strictly 
positive, are defined as  δ γ,  and  ) 1 ( δ γ − − ; 
(vi)  population (N(t) at t)grows at n, and each person always 
supplies one unit of labour; the Harrod neutral technology 
parameter, (B(t) at t), grows at b;   4
(vii)  there are no extraction costs for oil; 
(viii)  there are no adjustment costs for any factors, nor for 
consumption; 
(ix)  agents are identical; they are immortal, or display full 
intergenerational altruism, but discount the utility from future 
consumption  per head at a strictly positive constant rate of 
impatience  β ; 
(x)  the consumption-elasticity of the marginal utility of 
consumption per head (coefficient of relative risk aversion, 
reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption 
substitution) is a strictly positive parameter, α ; 
(xi)  initial values of B,  K,  N and S are all given at the current 
planning date, 0;  




The agent’s optimization problem may be treated as governing the choice 
of the initial value of consumption (c(0)) and paths for the subsequent 
evolution of consumption, capital and remaining (unextracted) oil stocks, 
which will follow from maximizing the integral, call it φ : 
 
dt t K t N t c t S t N t B t TK t t c e







− − − − − + − − ∫
δ γ δ γ α β λ α
                                                                                                       (1) 
 
subject to the initial conditions in assumption (xi).  The budget constraint 
here is an aggregate one, an innocuous device for avoiding needless 
clutter.     5
 
First order conditions with respect to consumption per head at t and the 
Lagrange multiplier at t imply  ) ( ) ( ) ( t N t t c e
t λ
α β =
− −  (so that 
 
) ( / ) ( )] ( )[ ( / ) ( t c t c n t t t
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+ + ≡ α β                     (2)) 
 
and a restatement of the budget restraint, respectively.  There is also a 
pair of Euler conditions: 
 
⇒ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂
•
dt t K d t K / )} ( / { ) ( / φ φ ) ( / ) ( ) ( ) ( t K t Q t r t γ λ = = −
∧
                    (3) 
⇒ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂
•
dt t S d t S / )} ( / { ) ( / φ φ
∧ • ∧
= − ∂ ∂ = − ) ( / ))} ( ( / ) ( { ) ( t P dt t S t Q n d t l λ   (4). 
 
Here, r is the real rate of interest, and P the price of oil.  Together, (3) and 
(4) imply the Hotelling (Hotelling, (1931)) condition 
∧
= P r .  This is an 
asset arbitrage condition, stating that capital and oil-left-in-the-ground 
must bear the same expected yields.  Combining (2) and (3) gives the 
familiar law of motion for consumption per head, namely that its trend 
should equal the ratio of the gap between the real interest rate and the 
sum of the impatience and population growth rates, to the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion.  
 
The list of dramatis personae in this set up is quite long, but can be 
helpfully divided into two categories: variables that will be stationary in 
the long run, and those that will not (except possibly by freak).  In the 
first group come r (the real interest rate), the growth rate of final output 
(call it g), the proportionate rate at which the stock of oil is extracted (call 
it x) and the ratio of consumption per head to capital per head (call it ξ ) .    6
The latter group includes aggregate output and capital (Q(t) and K(t)), the 
price of oil (P(t)) and consumption per head (c(t)). 
 
Let us start by pinpointing the steady state values of r, g, x and ξ , and 
then examine the dynamics of these four variables out of steady state.  
 
2.3 The Steady State 
 
In steady state we have 
 
r* =  ] [ b n α β + + Λ     
g*= ] / )) 1 ( )( 1 ( [ δ α β δ γ − − − − − + Λ n n b  
x*= ] / ) 1 ( )( 1 ( ) / )( 1 [( δ δ γ α δ β γ − − − − + − Λ n b  
] / ) 1 )( )( ( ) ( )[ / ( * δ γ δ γ β γ α γ ξ − + + + − Λ + − = n b n                                    (5)                                 
 
where  . ] / ) 1 ( 1 [
1 − − − + ≡ Λ δ δ γ α    
 
Several features of interest are immediately apparent from (5).  The 
impatience rate β  raises the long run oil depletion and real interest rates, 
and impedes growth.   The energy rent share of income,  ), 1 ( δ γ − −  also 
retards growth, but reduces the real rate of interest and the depletion rate 
if and only if the marginal utility of consumption is elastic  ) 1 ( > α .  If 
) 1 ( δ γ − − becomes vanishingly small, Λ tends to unity, and the steady 
state growth and real interest rates go to their standard Ramsey values 
(b+n,  and  ) b n α β + + .  The rate of technical progress exerts positive 
influences on growth and real interest, and raises (reduces) oil depletion 
when α -1 is positive (negative).   A more basic point is that the four RHS 
variables in (9) are codetermined, so it is unwise, in this setting at least, to   7
ask how one of them affects another.  The price of oil, P, climbs in steady 
state at the real interest rate, which is increasing in impatience, population 
growth, relative risk aversion, and technical progress.    
2.4  Adjustment to the Steady State 
 
The next task is to study how this steady state is approached.  Since 
K Q r / γ =  at all dates, the dynamics of r will obey 
∧ ∧ ∧
− = K t Q t r ) ( ) ( (t), while 
the budget constraint implies  ξ γ − =
∧
/ ) ( ) ( t r t K , so that 
γ ξ / ) ( ) ( ) ( t r t g t r − + =
∧
.                                                                            (6) 
 
The growth rate of the consumption – capital ratio, ξ , will meanwhile be 
∧ ∧ ∧
− + = ) ( ) ( ) ( t K n t c t ξ , which, from (2), (3) and the budget constraint implies 
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• ) and use of the Hotelling condition give 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t x t x t r t g − + =
∧
, and total differentiation of the production function 
implies  )), ( ) ( )( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( t x t x n b t K t g − − − + + + =
∧ ∧
δ γ δ γ  so that 
 
γξ δ δ γ − + = − +
∧
) ( )) ( ) ( )( ( n b t x t x ;                                                             (8) 
 
and substitution for g(t) in (6) establishes the dynamics of the real interest 
rate:   8
 
). /( } { / ) 1 )( ( ) ( δ γ ξ δ γ γ + + + + − − =
∧
n b t r t r                                                 (9) 
 
 
Together, (7), (8) and (9) constitute the system’s dynamics in terms of 
three independent variables, the real interest rate, the consumption-capital 
ratio and the rate of extraction of oil.  The growth rate has been 
substituted out.   
 
The geometry of this model can take three forms.  The simplest occurs 
when the competitive profit share equals the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion, since, in that special case, the path to the steady state involves 
nothing more than a gradual convergence of the real interest rate.  The 
extraction rate and the consumption-capital ratio are trendless in 
transitions.  The log of the oil price rises, asymptotically decelerating or 
accelerating, depending on whether the initial stock of capital, relative to 
other variables, is scarcer or more abundant then than later on.   In this 
freak case where γ α = , the saddle path in consumption-capital space is 
unit-elastic, and agents’ labour supplies – were they to enter 
intratemporal utility – would be constant along any transition, too.  
 
Much likelier, however, is the case where  γ α > .  Unity lies at the lower 
end of estimates and assumptions commonly made
2 about α , and an 
immense volume of data, covering most countries for quite long periods, 
pinpoints the profit share of income firmly within the range 0.3 to 0.4.  So 
here utility is essentially more concave in consumption, than output in 
capital.  In this case, the stationarity loci for all three variables (for r and 
                                                 
2 As for example by Lucas (2000, 2003) who assumes that this parameter is unitary.   9
ξ  in ( ) ,ξ r space, and x in ( ) ,ξ x space) all slope upwards. Scrutiny reveals 
that there is a unique saddle path towards the steady state, in which r, x 
and  ξ  all move in the same direction, and the adjustment speed for r is 
slower than when  γ α = .  (This reflects the fact that agents display a 
distaste for consumption varying much over time, so that capital cannot 
adjust rapidly, and neither, therefore, could r).  Here, assuming that r 
converges from above, capital will be climbing faster than consumption, 
though neither will be rising very fast.  The fact that intertemporal 
substitution in consumption is not particularly strong here warns us to 
expect (correctly) that oil depletion begins at a higher rate than later on.   
When r is falling (rising) in the transition, the log of the oil price will be 
decelerating (accelerating).   In what follows, this case where the 
marginal utility of consumption is more elastic in consumption, than 
output in capital, will receive the greatest attention below. 
 
Formal completeness calls on us to consider the opposite case.  The 
stationarity locus for ξ  now slopes downward.  Adjustment towards the 
steady state is rather rapid this time, with consumption moving more 
quickly than capital.  Agents exhibit a very high degree of flexibility in 
their consumption behaviour, and it is this that implies that x will climb 
towards its steady state value when r is falling, improbable as this may 
seem.   
 
The degenerate knife-edge case where  γ α = , the “usual” case where 
γ α > , and the improbable case where  γ α < are illustrated, respectively, in 
Figs 1, 2 and 3.   
 
2.5 Shocks    10
 
The point has now been reached where we can now amend our 
assumption about foresight, and entertain the possibility of permanent 
shocks to the parameters that frame the system.   These parameters 
include: 
 
(i)  the level of (Hicks-neutral) technology; 
(ii)  the level of current population; 
(iii)  the level of (Harrod-neutral) technology; 
(iv)  the stock of unextracted oil in the earth’s crust; 
(v)  the current stock of capital; 
(vi)  the trend in population; 
(vii)  the trend in the (Harrod-neutral) technology parameter; 
(viii)  the rate of impatience.   
 
 
By refining the model, this list of shocks could be easily expanded to add 
in such things as a shock to the rate of depreciation
3, or change in the 
extent to which income taxation was intertemporally distorting
4.  Yet 
other possibilities include shocks to current beliefs about the value any of 
the above parameters might take on and after some future date; and 
combining current actual shocks with current shocks to beliefs about the 
future allows one to entertain the possibility of transitory shocks as well.  
These further cases will not be discussed here.   
 
                                                 
3 The budget constraint is amended to distinguish net from gross investment, and the marginal product 
of capital will now exceed the real rate of interest; while qualitative implications for the steady state 
solutions and saddle paths are not radical, faster (slower) depreciation would act much like a drop (rise) 
in (i).    
4 This would drive a wedge between r (the cost of capital) and (
∧
+ + c n α β ), acting not unlike a drop 
in (i).  
   11
Suppose a shock occurs when the economy has attained its steady state.  
Rises in (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv), and falls in (v), all have the effect of raising 
the marginal product of capital.  This is guaranteed within our Cobb-
Douglas set up, where the marginal product of any factor is increased 
following a rise in the input of another
5.   There is no impact on the 
steady state solutions for r, x or ξ  .  None of the three stationarity loci is 
disturbed.   Unless shocked again, the economy evolves back towards its 
steady state in the space of our key three variables.  Since r jumps, only 
to slide back subsequently, the same thing happens to the consumption-
capital ratio, and to x, the oil extraction rate.  
 
How is the oil price affected?   The first three events (permanent, surprise 
increases in B, N or T) would cause it to jump upwards: this is suggested 
by the marginal productivity condition  ). ( ) ( / ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( t S t x t Q t P δ γ − − =   
Population and technology jumps raise Q(t). But the impact is weakened 
somewhat, though not negated, by the (temporary) rise in the real interest 
rate, and the accompanying rise in x that we must experience if  γ α > .  
After this, the oil price will grow at a faster, but slowly declining rate, 
until the steady state is reattained.   
 
A fall in capital, event (v), would trigger two downward pressures on the 
price of oil: first, output would fall (but by a smaller proportion, since 
1 < γ ); and second, the (temporary) jump in the real interest rate would 
act to lower the discounted present value of every asset, including oil.  
                                                 
5 With three factor, constant returns to scale production functions it is possible that this condition might 
fail for some pair of factors; and with substitution elasticities non-unitary, technological progress can, 




   12
From then on, oil prices would drift up at an elevated but diminishing 
speed.   
 
Unexpected discoveries lead to an unanticipated jump in  ) (t S .  If x(t) and  
Q(t) were unchanged, P(t) would fall equiproportionately.  But Q(t) will 
tend to rise (the direct effect displays an elasticity of  δ γ − − 1 ).  That acts 
to cushion the fall in the oil price, while the transitory upward pressure on 
the marginal product of capital operates in the opposite direction, and 
reinforces it.   These conflicting secondary effects could cancel as a 
special case; the prediction of a negative overall impact effect on the 
price of oil is secure.   
 
None of these five events has any effect on the steady state values of the 
rates of depletion, interest or growth.   All that happens is a sudden shift 
to the relevant saddle path leading back to an unchanged long run 
equilibrium, as far as these variables are concerned.   But there is of 
course a permanent shift in the level of oil prices, as well as a phase 
during which they grow (future shocks apart) at a rate that differs from 
r*.   
 
But the invariance of the steady state values of growth, interest, depletion 
and the consumption-capital ratio does not hold true, however, for our 
sixth, seventh and eighth events.  As (5) makes plain, the steady state now 
changes.  A faster growth rate of population, suddenly anticipated now 
for the indefinite future, would, (7), (8) and (9) tell us, shift the 
stationarity loci up for x(t), down for r(t), and up (down) for ξ , if α  was 
less (more) than unity.        The changes in the three stationarity loci, and 
the impact upon the steady state values of r, x and ξ , are presented in the   13
following Table.  The three shocks considered here are falls in the rates of 
impatience, Harrod neutral technical progress, and population growth.  
 
 
TABLE: EFFECTS OF PARAMETER DISTURBANCES 6, 7 and 8 
 
Shock: 
Fall in  












β   down        down       down  no  shifts R  no 
b  down down 
(iff 
) 1 > α  
down 
(given 
) γ α >  
shifts L  no  shifts L 
n  down up  (iff 
) 1 > α  
down 
(?) 
shifts L  shifts L 




3.  Wrinkles 
 
There are numerous additional considerations (as well as those alluded to 
above) that one would wish to introduce in a more realistic framework.  A 
brief list could include: 
 
(a) renewables; 
(b) the apparent failure of ex post oil price paths to match Hotelling’s 
predictions;  
(c) extraction costs; 
(d) imperfect competition on the part of oil owners; 
(e) global warming;   14
(f) tax issues; 
(g) stochastics; 
(h) crude refinement; 
(i) temporary restrictions on supply; 
(j) oil as a consumer good, and, more generally, consumption 
disaggregation; 
(k) capital disaggregation and vintage effects; 
(l) international disaggregation; 
(m)  money, (temporary) non-clearing and nominal inertia. 
 
 
Wrinkle (a): renewables 
 
Wave, wind and hydro are all renewable energy sources.  So, more 
arguably, is nuclear (uranium and plutonium stocks are the only 
restriction here).  The first three provide as yet only a tiny fraction of 
world energy supplies, though it is expected to grow; nuclear’s 
contribution has been dwindling, with decommissioning outpacing 
construction of new stations for nearly two decades.   But there is the 
distinct possibility that hydrogen-based energy (a proven though fledgling 
and as yet inconvenient technology) could displace one day fossil fuels in 
most if not all applications.  More speculatively, cold fusion is one of a 
gamut of conceivable alternatives that might eventually eliminate the 
need for burning fossil fuels.   Economists generally start to model such 
alternatives by hypothesizing either a date, or a unit cost, at which this 
“backstop technology” suddenly becomes viable and takes over 
completely.  It follows that, under certainty, the earth’s proven reserves of 
oil will all presumably have been extracted at this date (at least all oil 
reserves that are worth extracting).   The price path from now to the   15
takeover date follows Hotelling, and the demand integral over this period 
must match today’s stock.  That is why prespecifying both the date and 
the cost of the new technology would lead to overdetermination. 
 
(b) Does Hotelling Work? 
 
There should be nothing systematic about surprises.  Yet real oil prices 
have displayed long periods with a downward trend, not the upward trend 
at the real rate of interest predicted ex ante by the simplest version of 
Hotelling’s model.  This was especially true of the years from the Korean 
War peak (1951) down to 1971-2, and again from 1980 to the late 1990s 
(apart from a brief jump in the first Iraq war).  Trends for much of the 
inter-war years, and even before 1914, are not dissimilar.  A crude 
representation of the data suggests sudden, occasional jumps, often 
triggered by war, followed by protracted unwinding.    
 
This broad pattern of non-stationarity, or rather difference-stationarity 
with stochastic trends, is certainly the main finding by the influential 120 
year study of oil and other primary commodity prices by Ahrens and 
Sharma (1997), among others; similar views are discussed, and mainly 
upheld, in several surveys (eg Labys (2005)).  But Lee, List and 
Strazicich (2005), exploiting new techniques for multiple unknown break 
detection, conclude that the Ahrens-Sharma data for eleven non-
renewable natural resource prices in fact display stationarity around 
stochastic trends, with structural breaks in both height and trend.  These 
interesting results are certainly less inconsistent with the Hotelling story.      
 
Extending the model above may also help to reconcile the Hotelling 
hypothesis with the data.  Negative trends in real oil prices may be due to   16
falling extraction costs: it is the margin above these that, according to 
simple arbitrage, should be expected to climb at the real rate of interest, 
not the oil price itself.  And technological progress that reduces extraction 
costs does not have to come as a surprise here – the mechanism works 
most strongly when it is predicted.  Relaxing the assumption of perfect 
competition, replacing it instead by monopoly, leads to the result that the 
marginal revenue, net of extraction costs, that should ascend at this rate.  
Stiglitz (1974) shows that if the demand for oil is log-concave, the 
elasticity of demand should rise over time, and that the monopolist’s time 
path for real oil prices would trend up more gradually.   One can also 
argue that oil discoveries have in fact usually occurred as surprises.  
 
(c): extraction costs 
 
Unfortunately, very strict restrictions on these are required to generate a 
steady state in our model; but partial equilibrium simplifications can be 
adapted to handle a wide variety of possibilities (costs that may vary with 
the rate of extraction, with short run adjustment costs, with the remaining 
stocks, and across wells).  The Hotelling rule also changes: see (b) above. 
 
(d): imperfect competition among oil owners 
 
The monopoly story is straightforward (see Stiglitz (1974)).  Buiter 
(1981) has an extension to the relation between a colluding oligopoly, 
OPEC, and a competitive fringe.  Hartwick and Sadorsky (1990) have a 
duopoly model.  More complex oligopoly models have proved intractable 
thus far, except in simple cases like symmetric Cournot with isoelastic 
demand and no backstop technology: for in these circumstances, the   17
principle that all oil must have been extracted at time infinity means that 
the difference with perfect competition vanishes. 
 
(e) global warming   
 
The model sketched out in this paper can be adapted to cope with a linear 
negative feedback from the rate of oil extraction to the rate of technical 
progress, and a modified steady state results (Sinclair, 1994); an earlier 
paper (1992) does this in the context of a Solowian (1974) setup.  Ulph 
and Ulph (1994) contest Sinclair’s policy inferences, but in a partial 
framework; they argue that oil taxes may decline in a social optimum but 
do not necessarily have to do so.  Barrett (1990), Nordhaus (1994) and 
Seabright (1993) are other early papers that address aspects of this 
problem.  One of many difficulties here is that policies to stimulate or 
advance the date of a backstop technology can be perverse, if they lead 
oil owners to accelerate depletion.  
 
(f): tax issues 
 
One problem that arises is that the steady state marginal product of capital 
can easily become contaminated by taxation.  This must occur if all 
income is taxed, with deduction for neither capital income nor net 
investment (Chamley (1986), Lucas (1990))
6.  Intertemporally distorting 
taxation can clearly alter long run equilibrium oil extraction rates and 
price paths.  Expectations of future tax rates also matter.  And the tax 
treatment of oil is particularly relevant.  In the simplest, infinite horizon 
case, with a fixed stock of oil that will all be extracted eventually, the 
                                                 
6 Although, when confronted with the inconvenient fact of mortality, these findings may be modified in 
the absence of full intergenerational altruism.   18
excess of the price of oil over its extraction cost pure rent, that can be 
taxed away with no effects save on the net incomes of oil sellers.  This 
follows if the oil tax is constant and ad valorem.  A trend in this tax rate, 




Our model can be extended to a random environment by applying   
Bellman equations and the techniques and ideas explored by Lucas and 
Stokey (1991).  An early application to oil is by Hartwick and Yeung 
(1988).  
 
(h): crude refinement 
 
It is refined oil, not crude oil, that generates electricity, heats buildings 
and powers vehicles.  There are capacity constraints on refined output, 
and when these are suddenly changed, the price margins between the two 
sets of fuel can change sharply, if only temporarily.   Refiners are also 
imperfect competitors, leading to the possibility of double-margining of 
retail prices (treble-margining, when indirect taxes are added) as well as 
backward-passing to crude sellers. 
 
(i): temporary restrictions on supply 
 
In the very short run, both supply and demand elasticities for oil are very 
low; 0.1 is a typical number attached to both.  This means that oil prices 
can spike up or down by large amounts with unexpected changes in 
supply (war, hurricanes, embargos) or indeed demand (exceptional 
weather).  What frequently limits the size of these changes, however, is   19
the reserves of private oil companies, the strategic reserves of 
governments, and opportunities for some large, very low marginal cost 
suppliers (eg Saudi Arabia) to adjust supply quite quickly or run down or 
add to stocks.       
 
(j): oil as a consumer’s good, and, more generally, consumption 
disaggregation  
 
Our model treats oil as a producer’s good, not a consumption good.   
Extending the set up to allow for the latter is straightforward when Cobb 
Douglas intratemporal preferences are assumed between oil consumption 
and other types of consumption, but less so when preferences are more 
complex than this – if a closed form steady state solution is required.  
There may also be a multiplicity of consumption goods, varying in the oil 
intensity of their production.  In this case, a unique steady state solution 
calls for a unit-elastic aggregate demand elasticity for oil as an input, 
clearly a restrictive assumption. 
 
(k) capital disaggregation, and vintage effects 
 
Econometricians, led by Jorgenson, have found that substitution between 
energy and capital is much larger in the long run (around unity) than the 
short run (e.g. 0.1 on a current – quarter basis).  Substitution is easier ex 
ante than ex post (although not strictly impossible ex post).  Empirical 
models built on Ramsey-type foundations need to allow for this, as much 
as for other wrinkles.    
 
(l) international disaggregation 
   20
The model presented here displays no geography; it is a model for a 
closed system, or the world as a whole.  Geographical disaggregation is 
easy, if transport costs are ignored, and capital markets integrated: 
countries with larger (smaller) endowments of oil, relative to their GDP, 
are exporters (importers).  Oil export revenues are not matched by 
imports of the standard consumption good: part of them goes to fund 
accumulation of capital claims, and with marginal products of capital 
equalized across the world, the physical capital to which the claim is title 
will often reside in oil importing countries.  The short run consequences 
of unexpected oil price changes on exporting and importing countries are 
well surveyed by Corden (1984). 
 
(j) money, disequilibrium, nominal inertia, etc.        
 
The shorter-run effects of oil price changes on employment, growth, and 
the inflation-unemployment trade-off are examined by many authors; 
Bruno and Sachs (1982, 1982) provide classic treatments.    
 
It is helpful to think of a three dimensional factor-price frontier, depicting 
the largest real wage rate that can be paid for given levels of the real price 
of oil and the real return to capital.  A sudden jump in either of the latter 
two, unaccompanied by a compensating fall in the other, must, with given 
technology, imply a fall in the equilibrium real wage rate.  If legal 
restrictions, union power, monetary policy and information asymmetries 
combine to stop real wage rates falling (enough), unemployment can only 
go up.   But a higher oil price may also accompany a lower return to 
capital, and in two ways: as in our model, the prospect of a lower return 
to capital may generate an oil price jump, to a saddle path to a new steady 
state; or, and this is the Bruno-Sachs interpretation, an exogenous oil   21
price jump may just (temporarily?) transfer profits to oil rents.  In the 
latter case, one expects investment to slip.  Monetary policies that   
attempt to insulate investment and employment from the effects of dearer 
oil risk a large lurch in actual and expected inflation, with, the data from 
the 1970s suggest, very little in the way of transitory benefits to offset 
those costs.     
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